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Water Scarcity: Preventing
Future Conflicts
Rush O’Connor*
This Note focuses on nations with shared water sources
forming transboundary agreements to promote peaceful solutions
and to protect people’s right to water. Given the growing scarcity
of water, this Note emphasizes the urgent need to create
agreements. It argues that international agreements are
ineffective with respect to protecting the right to water and do not
create proper forums for settling disputes over water. Yet
international organizations can take an active role in helping to
form transboundary agreements and acting as mediators when an
agreement fails. This Note then explores how transboundary
agreements work and why they are better than international
agreements when protecting the right to water. In particular, the
Note examines two of the more successful examples—the
International Joint Commission and the Indus Water
Commission—and how they can serve as models for other
agreements. Finally, the Note then outlines the components
necessary for effective transboundary agreements, which will in
turn create a safer world and protect the right to water.
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I. Introduction
There are 263 sources of fresh water shared by multiple nations.1
These water sources serve about 40% of the world’s population and
account for approximately 60% of the total fresh water on the planet.2
Of the 263 shared sources of water, only 105 of the sources are the
subject of an agreement regulating what a nation may do with the
source.3 Most of the existing fresh-water agreements are significantly
limited in scope.4 Although some shared sources of water may not soon
create controversy, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) predicts that “by 2050 almost 40 per cent of the
world population will live in areas of high water stress.”5 One study
suggests that four billion people currently experience water scarcity
during at least one month of the year.6 Since World War II, there have
been 37 conflicts over shared sources of water.7 While most were minor,
more conflicts are likely to arise as the planet becomes more arid.8 To
address this problem before it worsens, every nation with a shared
source of water should create a bilateral or multilateral agreement
equipped to handle any disputes over the shared body of water. By
examining the failures of other strategies and the benefits of
transboundary agreements, it is possible to see how all countries with
shared resources must form transboundary agreements to better protect
water rights for all.
1. U.N. WATER, TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS: SHARING BENEFITS, SHARING
RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (2008).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Rebecca Lowe & Emily Silvester, Water Shortages Threaten Global Security,
68 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 42 (2014).
6. Mesfin M. Mekonnen & Arjen Y. Hoekstra, Four Billion People Facing Severe
Water Scarcity, 2 SCIENCE ADVANCE 1 (2016).
7. Gordon Chang, Blue Gold: The Coming Water Wars, WORLD AFFAIRS (Oct.
2013), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/blue-gold-coming-water-
wars [https://perma.cc/Z96S-SXPM] (discussing how conflicts arose between
Israel and its neighbors, with some arguing that Six Day War came about
partially because of water).
8. U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 3.
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II. Background
A. Water Scarcity
Although water covers most of the Earth’s surface, fresh water has
become increasingly scarce, impacting countries and regions all over the
world. In the U.S., California has entered its fourth year of drought
and, despite being hit hard by El Nino in 2015, the drought will likely
continue.9 Syria has experienced a drought since the civil war began in
2011, and some researchers argue that the drought itself provided an
indirect cause of the conflict.10 The lack of water caused rising food
prices and placed stress on the sources of water that do exist in Syria,
all of which created unrest and government stress.11 The Aral Sea in
Central Asia, which provides water to about 43 million people through
the rivers it feeds, has shrunk to 10% of its original size since 1960.12 In
addition to these regions, South Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, and
North Korea all currently experiencing some of the worst droughts in
decades.13 As Earth becomes a drier planet, tensions will rise between
countries over shared sources of water.14
While it may not instantly lead to conflict, situations where one
country controls a shared source of water could lead to massive
droughts in another country or countries.15 For example, by building
dams on rivers shared with Syria and Iraq, Turkey has helped worsen
the water conditions for these two countries.16 Without enforcement
mechanisms and a forum to discuss the dam, Iraq and Syria lacked the
means to take preventive action.17 The dam drastically slows the flow
of the rivers to Syria and Iraq.18 This has in particular impacted Syria,
9. Paul Rogers, California drought: How will we know when it’s over?, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2016),
http://www.mercurynews.com/drought/ci_29364616/california-drought-
how-will-we-know-when-its?source=infinite-up [https://perma.cc/55LV-
7YEX].
10. Henry Fountain, Researchers Link Syrian Conflict to a Drought Made Worse
by Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), at A13.
11. Id.
12. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 48.
13. Terrell Johnson, California Isn’t Alone: Historic Droughts Happening Around
the World, WEATHER CHANNEL (Jul. 28, 2015),
http://www.weather.com/science/environment/news/california-historic-
drought-world-brazil-africa-korea.
14. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 42.
15. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 47.
16. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 47.
17. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 47.
18. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 47.
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which is already suffering from drought conditions.19 Because the
Middle East is one of the world’s most arid regions,20 similar situations
will inevitably lead to future conflict if countries do not establish
ground rules for using shared water sources. 21 Over time, nations have
tried multiple approaches to address this issue, such as international
agreements, regional agreements, and transboundary agreements.22
B. International Agreements
Some of the earliest attempts to protect the right to water took the
form of international agreements.23 Currently, there exists no
enforceable international treaty that has fully recognized an enforceable
right to safe access to water.24 The international community began
pushing for a recognition of this right during and immediately after
World War II.25 The 1949 Geneva Conventions forbid nations from
preventing access to water in times of war or conflict.26 This was further
expanded in the 1970s with Protocols I and II of the Geneva
Conventions, which made it a war crime to attack or destroy water
sources and installations.27
While there have been other attempts to make safe access to fresh
water a protected right for all, the most recent attempt occurred with
a resolution passed by the U.N. in 2010.28 However, the resolution did
not bind any country and instead merely recognized the right.29 Still,
121 nations supported the resolution, despite the fact that 41 nations
abstained from adopting it.30 One of the main reason that nations such
as the U.S. abstained from adopting the resolution was due to fear that
19. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 47.
20. See Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that Syria, Iraq, and Turkey
are three of the driest countries on Earth).
21. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 46–47.
22. Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation: From
Political Commitments to Customary Rule?, 3 NO. 5 PACE INT’L L. REV.
ONLINE COMPANION 136, 139 (2012).
23. Id. at 139.
24. Id. at 139.
25. Id. at 143–44.
26. Id. at 143–44.
27. Id. at 144.
28. Lori Beail-Farkas, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation: Context,
Contours, and Enforcement Prospects, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 761, 784 (2013); see
also G.A. Res. 64/292, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (Jul. 28,
2010).
29. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 784.
30. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 784–85.
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the resolution would interfere with U.N. actions in Geneva in regards
to the right to safe access to water.31 Further, concerns over what
exactly the right would require remained an issue for nations that
abstained from the vote.32 The nations that did vote for the resolution
voted for different reasons and recognized the right in different ways.33
This could create future problems, because the lack of consensus could
make the right difficult to enforce.34 While the resolution from the U.N.
General Assembly did recognize the right to water, Catarina de
Albuquerque, the U.N.’s Independent Expert, acknowledged that the
resolution at most existed as a “powerful symbolic gesture.”35 While
proclaiming the right, the resolution accomplishes little because it does
not define what the right entails.36 Although some nations support a
right that requires governments to provide safe access to water, others
disagree.37 Progress has been made on the international approach, but
regional agreements and bilateral agreements have done more to ensure
that nations have safe access to water. 38
C. Regional Agreements
Regional agreements often have a right to water included in their
charters.39 These agreements encourage peace by recognizing that all
people and their neighbors deserve the right to safe access to water.40
For instance, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) provide an
illustration of how most regional pacts deal with water.41
While not explicit, nations in the OAS recognized the right to safe
access to water under the right to basic public services in the Protocol
31. See Cavallo, supra note 22, at 169 (noting the U.S. urged caution adopting
the resolution because it was unclear what obligations it would have under
such an agreement).
32. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 784.
33. See Cavallo, supra note 22, at 170–73 (explaining how some states wished for
obligations from the governments between other nations and others who
viewed the right limited to only their own people).
34. Cavallo, supra note 22, at 170–73.
35. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 785.
36. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 785.
37. See Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 785 (arguing that nations have not fully
considered the “implications” of having the right).
38. See Cavallo, supra note 22, at 145–55 (discussing various regional agreements
pertaining to water rights).
39. Cavallo, supra note 22, at 145–55.
40. See Cavallo, supra note 22, at 145–55 (noting the language in many of the
agreements that imply access to water is an important right).
41. Cavallo, supra note 22, at 146.
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of San Salvador.42 The agreement focuses on nations ensuring that all
of their citizens have access to water.43 Yet, when it comes to
transboundary disputes, the protocol lacks a forum to settle them.44
In South Asia, the SAARC explicitly recognizes the right to safe
access to water.45 Again this encourages countries to recognize that
everyone who lives in their region has a right to safe access to water,
thus encouraging peaceful solutions when dealing with disputes of
shared sources of water.46 Like the OAS, this agreement also fails to
provide a mechanism to handle disputes.47
Regional pacts similar to international agreements generally focus
on having countries recognize the right to safe access to water, but
avoid the question of how to handle any disputes over water sources.48
The lack of a forum to address any issues between nations on shared
sources can lead to tensions without a means to resolve them.49 For
example, an agreement exists on the usage of the Nile River, but the
nations involved have failed to adjust the agreement to address modern
concerns.50 Because the agreement lacks any forum to address the
dispute, tensions have arisen, particularly for Egypt, which obtains 95%
of its water from the Nile River.51 Regional agreements have the
potential to help protect the right to water, but without enforcement
mechanisms, they remain as inefficient as international agreements.
D. Transboundary Agreements
Transboundary agreements involve at least two or more nations
and center on a shared source water or some other item.52
42. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador),
arts. 10–12, Nov. 17, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 156.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC], Social Charter
art. 3(4), (Jan. 4. 2004), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/02/2-03/saarc-
social-charter.xml [https://perma.cc/35L2-2XEH].
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Cavallo, supra note 22, at 145–55.
49. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 46–47.
50. See Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 46–47 (explaining that agreements
made during the colonial era failed to address the concerns of nations besides
Egypt and Sudan).
51. See Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 46–47 (discussing how while Egypt’s
former president did not wish for war, it remained an option).
52. U.N. WATER, supra note 2, at 3.
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Transboundary agreements over water provide a means to handle
disputes in a peaceful manner.53 Many of these agreements have the
same goal of protecting each nation’s right to the water source, but
they accomplish this by different means.54 Some treaties provide very
limited guidance on the use of a shared source of water, but others,
such as the International Joint Commission and Indus Waters Treaty,
provide an extensive framework that has helped protect the right to
safe access to water for all nations involved.55 These two treaties have
had more success than most, yet the agreements have some major
differences on how they handle disputes.56
1. The International Joint Commission
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 established the International
Joint Commission (IJC) to handle all disputes regarding shared sources
of water between Canada and U.S.57 While it has gone through some
revisions since the original treaty, the International Joint Commission
has helped resolve over 100 disputes that have arisen between the U.S.
and Canada.58 The treaty has provided a peaceful means to handle the
many shared sources of water between the two nations, and fosters a
means to provide the nations with the water their citizens need.59 Its
success stems from three elements of the treaty: (1) clearly indicating
exactly what rights each nation has in using any shared water source;
(2) creating a body with the authority to decide any disputes; and (3)
providing a neutral decision maker in case the International Joint
Commission finds itself in a stalemate.60
The treaty outlines the scope of the International Joint
Commission’s authority, and when nations can undertake projects with
shared water sources without having to consult with the International
Joint Commission or the other country.61 The main purpose of the
53. U.N. WATER, supra note 2, at 3.
54. U.N. WATER, supra note 2, at 3.
55. See generally U.N. WATER, supra note 2, at 5; see also Treaty between the
United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions
Arising between the United States and Canada, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909,
36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
56. U.N. WATER, supra note 2, at 3.
57. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55.
58. See Historical Highlights, INT’L JOINT COMM’N,
http://www.ijc.org/en_/IJC_History [https://perma.cc/R96F-FMHS] (last
visited Mar. 2, 2017) (explaining that the IJC has resolved issues over
pollution, energy projects, and more).
59. Id.
60. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55.
61. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. III–VI.
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agreement was to ensure that the natural level or flow of the water
source was not altered as a result of actions from either nation.62 Thus,
actions occurring wholly within the nation’s borders that only
minimally impacted the level or flow of water did not require regulation
from the International Joint Commission.63 These actions include
improvements to a harbor, deepening of channels, or any other
government projects that does not impact the flow or level of the
water.64
The agreement, however, provides extensive detail on which actions
should go to the International Joint Commission for review.65 For
instance, neither nation can build a dam or any other type of
obstruction that would improve the water levels for itself, but hurt the
other nation.66 The exception is if the International Joint Commission
grants approval to the nation seeking to build the obstruction by
majority vote.67 The treaty also forbids the pollution of the water source
should it impact the health or safety of the other nation.68 Either
country can request for the IJC to intervene if pollution by one country
is permitted.69 Article VI of the treaty goes into extreme detail when
limiting the U.S. to the exact amount of water it can divert from the
Milk River and explaining how much Canada can divert from the St.
Mary River.70 These details allow the U.S. and Canada to know exactly
what rights they have when using any shared resource. 71
The Boundary Water Treaty of 1909 not only provides specifics on
the treaty’s jurisdiction, but also the formation of the International
Joint Commission.72 The Commission consists of six appointed
members, three from each nation, and there are no special skills or
education requirements for each member.73 The Commission has
authority over any projects that should impact the level or flow of the
water source, and Article VIII establishes a standard for the priority of
62. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. III.
63. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. III.
64. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. III.
65. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. III–IV.
66. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. IV.
67. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. IV.
68. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. IV.
69. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. IV.
70. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VI.
71. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VI.
72. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VII–X.
73. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VII.
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certain rights when it comes to river usage.74 This agreement includes
details that other transboundary agreements lack, such as establishing
that a nation’s rights with respect to “domestic and sanitary purposes”
has the highest priority, followed by navigational purposes, and lastly
electrical and irrigation purposes.75 Projects that satisfy the last right
but violate the first two rights would require the International Joint
Commission to reject the project.76 Anything that violates the first
priority requires the IJC to reject the project.77 However, the treaty
gives the Commission wide discretion on any case. For example, the
Commission may require the nation requesting the project to take
remedial action to compensate for losses the other country may suffer
if the project receives approval.78
The International Joint Commission decides all issues on a majority
vote.79 In instances of tie breakers the commissioners will send a report
to each of their respected governments, which then provides its input
to its commissioners to resolve the dispute.80 In some instances the U.S.
and Canadian governments may ask the Commission to make a finding
on an issue. Following a majority vote, the Commission will send a
report to the two governments, who will then make the decision on the
issue.81 The negotiation process then remains with the two governments
to make all the decisions by their own standards, or, alternatively, they
can send instructions to their representatives to address the issue.82 The
last mechanism goes into effect if the IJC fails to resolve the issue. If
this happens, the treaty provides for a “neutral umpire” as prescribed
under Article XLV of the Hague Convention. 83 The treaty exists so
that the IJC can resolve all disputes, and only in the rare instance of a
tie will a neutral observer be requested by either nation to resolve the
problem.84
74. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
75. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
76. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
77. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
78. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
79. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
80. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
81. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. X.
82. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
83. Neither country has ever used this provision for the two ties that occur.
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
84. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII.
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With the treaty existing for over a 100 years, the IJC has only
voted in a tie twice.85 The first tied vote dealt with one case to reopen
a previous IJC decision, while the second tie dealt with a study to be
conducted by the IJC.86 In the first instance, the previous decisions by
the IJC governed the dispute; in the second, the IJC decided not to
conduct the study.87 Neither country has ever requested a neutral
umpire, but since there have only been two tied votes, there have been
few instances that would allow this to happen.88
By providing details on the rights of each nation, the treaty allows
the Commission to know when one party acts in the wrong.89 The
Commission has succeeded by finding solutions to nearly every issue.90
While the treaty has had plenty of success, other agreements have
succeeded with different formulas, such as the Indus Waters Treaty of
1960.
2. Indus Waters Treaty of 1960
The Indus Waters Treaty has often received praise for its ability to
have its terms enforced, despite the multiple wars between India and
Pakistan since its inception.91 While the Indus Waters Treaty and the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 have some similarities, differences do
exist.92 For example, the Indus Waters Treaty specifies what the treaty
will cover and provides for the formation of a commission and a neutral
decision maker, yet it approaches these aims in very different manner.93
The Indus Waters Treaty placed requirements on both nations
depending on where the rivers or tributaries flowed from.94 With rivers
flowing east, Pakistan had a duty to ensure that flow remained the
same and that India had unrestricted access.95 The duty is reversed with
all western flowing rivers.96 In regards to unrestricted access, both
85. DENNIS SCHORNACK & JOHN NEVIN, THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION:
A Case Study in the Management of International Waters 6 (2006).
86. Id. (rejecting a study over the apportionment of the Waterton and Belly
Rivers).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 6–7.
89. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. III–X.
90. SCHORNACK & NEVIN, supra note 85, at 6.
91. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5, at 45.
92. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55; see also Indus Waters Treaty, India-
Pak., Sep. 19, 1960.
93. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92.
94. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. II–IV.
95. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. II–IV.
96. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. II–IV.
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countries could always use the source of water for certain domestic uses,
such as harbor improvements or projects intended to improve
navigation of the water source.97 The treaty also required both nations
to maintain certain drainage systems, so as to control the flow of the
rivers in a manageable manner.98 While the treaty covers an expansive
number of issues, both countries may take action to prevent erosion or
to remove sand bars from a river without consulting the other country.99
Similar to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the Indus Waters
Treaty also discourages any undue pollution, and requires countries to
take preventive action.100
The treaty further specifies other requirements for the two
nations.101 Unlike the IJC, the treaty creates a financial obligation for
certain projects that will be necessary in the upkeep of the Indus River
Basin for projects dealing with drainage or irrigation.102 The cost varies
depending on where the project occurs.103 Also, the treaty requires India
and Pakistan to exchange data on the river in order to keep track of
the flow and the water quality of the river.104 Lastly, in Article VII, the
treaty provides an option to conduct future projects that can be done
together in regards to the Indus River Basin.105 By establishing detailed
standards, India and Pakistan clarify what rights and obligations each
country has regarding the handling of the rivers.
In regards to the setup of the Indus Commission, differences begin
to emerge between the Indus Waters Treaty and the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909. Whereas the International Joint Commission has three
commissioners from each country, the Indus Commission only has one
commissioner appointed from each country, and each commissioner
must hold the qualifications of an engineer specializing in hydrology
and water use.106 Further, while in most instances the commissioners
will represent their countries on any issue subject to the treaty, the
countries have the option to approach each other directly at any time
to handle an issue.107 Because the commissioners essentially act as
97. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. II–IV.
98. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. II–IV.
99. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IV.
100. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IV.
101. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. V.
102. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. V.
103. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VI.
104. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 93, at art. VII.
105. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VII.
106. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VII; see also Indus Waters
Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VIII.
107. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VIII.
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ambassadors for the two countries for water issues, India and Pakistan
have granted their commissioners diplomatic immunity in order to
“safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection
with the Commission.”108 Should disputes arise, the Indus Commission
shall always examine the issue first.109 If the dispute continues, then a
neutral expert will come in at the request of either country.110 The
World Bank appoints the neutral expert, who must have an engineering
background.111 The neutral expert will then proceed to attempt a
solution.112 However, if this fails, then the treaty provides two more
alternatives.113 The governments can either negotiate between
themselves or use a court of arbitration, organized by the World Bank,
to settle the dispute.114
The Indus Waters Treaty provides multiple ways to resolve issues
that may arise when it comes to the Indus River Basin, which has
helped to continue cooperation even in times of war.115 Unlike the IJC,
the Indus Commission has made use of its Neutral Expert.116 Yet, with
only two commissioners, split votes will more likely occur more often.
This process has helped resolve disputes involving the Kishanganga
Dam and Baglihar Dam.117 In these instances, the Neutral Expert
approved the dams but required India to ensure that the river continued
at a certain flow level.118 By providing details on the treaty’s scope, the
rights of each nation, and a system to handle disputes, these two
countries have created a system that ensures that both sides can resolve
issues over water peacefully.
108. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VIII.
109. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IX.
110. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IX.
111. 2007 Neutral Expert Gives His Judgement on Baglihar Dam, DAWN (July 2,
2011, 3:06 PM), http://www.dawn.com/news/640989/2007-neutral-expert-
gives-his-judgement-on-baglihar-dam [https://perma.cc/5LBY-EKVW].
112. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IX.
113. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IX.
114. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IX.
115. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VIII; see also Lowe & Silvester,
supra note 6, at 45.
116. Zafar Bhutta, Kishanganga Project Victory Claims Cloud Final Arbitration
Award, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Dec. 22, 2013),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/648986/kishanganga-project-victory-claims-
cloud-final-arbitration-award/ [https://perma.cc/K7YF-J68M].
117. Id.
118. Id.
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III. Why Transboundary Agreements?
While water-rights advocates tend to focus on international
agreements, which reach more nations, international agreements often
have flaws.119 Transboundary agreements can help address these flaws
more efficiently than international agreements.
A. The Flaws in an International Solution
The key flaws of an international agreement deal with enforcement
issues, defining the right, and failure to address location-specific
problems.120 The international order does have some enforcement
mechanisms, but they are extremely limited in their power.121 The
International Criminal Court can enforce the right in times of conflict
and war, but otherwise has very limited jurisdiction.122 Alternatively,
the International Court of Justice can help resolve disputes between
nations,123 which is a necessity with 263 sources of water.124 Lastly,
certain treaties, such as the Geneva Convention, contain enforcement
mechanisms for those that signed the treaties.125 However, the
international-treaty approach has limits, since many nations falsify
reports that they are required to submit in accordance with their treaty
obligations.126 Further, enforcement often takes far too long for those
that choose not to hide their violations.127 While enforcement exposes
some serious limitations to international agreements, other flaws exist.
Another issue that exists with international agreements centers on
the definition of the right.128 With any agreement, defining the terms
can be difficult; adding every nation amplifies this problem. 129 For
instance, while no nation voted to oppose to the right to safe access to
water, 41 nations still abstained in a U.N. General Assembly vote due
to disagreements over how to define that right and whether the U.N.
General Assembly was the proper organization to protect it.130 This vote
119. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 793–800.
120. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 793–800.
121. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 792.
122. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 792.
123. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 792.
124. U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 1.
125. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 793–94.
126. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 793.
127. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 794.
128. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 786.
129. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 786–88.
130. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 785.
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alone demonstrates the strong disagreement over the definition of the
right and what instrument should serve as the means of safeguarding
it.131 When vague terms are used in international agreements to gain
consensus, vague solutions are often the result, given the opportunity
for disagreement over interpretations, even when enforcement measures
exist.132 A lack of specifics prevents nations from knowing whether
another country committed a wrong or not under a treaty. With so
many nations involved, international agreements will always have
limits given the inability to agree on details.
The last major problem with international solutions deals with the
issue of location-specific problems.133 All countries have different
priorities; consequently, one solution is unlikely to fit every situation
and may not fully address the specific issue between two nations.134 Big
but general solutions that try to satisfy multiple countries will likely
lead to certain areas not being addressed.135
B. How Transboundary Agreements Address These Issues
Bilateral or multilateral agreements can succeed where
international agreements struggle because they have more flexibility,
while still making use of international institutions to resolve disputes
when necessary.136 These transboundary water agreements succeed
because they can set the parameters, details, and means for enforcing
the agreement.137 While the number of nations that join bilateral or
multilateral agreements will be smaller than that of international
agreements, they have the benefit of addressing specific issues and
providing a worthwhile solution.
In regard to enforcement, successful bilateral agreements work
when the member nations have vested authority in a commission or
other body that has some independence but still permits countries’
involvement.138 This solution removes the enforcement of any disputes
from the nations’ hands, but still allows the nations to have an input
as they are the ones that appoint the officials.139 For instance, in the
131. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 784.
132. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 784–86.
133. Ling-Yee Huang, Not Just Another Drop in the Human Rights Bucket: The
Legal Significance of a Codified Human Right to Water, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L.
360 (2008).
134. Id. at 360.
135. Id.
136. U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 6.
137. PATRICIA WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW – FACILITATING TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER COOPERATION 17 (2013).
138. Id. at 22.
139. Id. at 22.
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Indus Waters Treaty, India and Pakistan grant all authority to a
commissioner chosen to represent each nation.140 Should the
commissioners fail, the treaty allows India and Pakistan to bring in a
neutral expert who can enforce a decision or a court of arbitration,
which also holds the power to enforce a decision.141 Most of the time,
disagreements can be handled between the two countries, but when this
fails an international organization can come in to decide the issue.142
Similarly, under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, disputes are
handled by the six-person commission, which has three members
appointed from each nation.143 Like India and Pakistan, the U.S. and
Canada vest authority in a commission, while still having a say by
appointing the commissioners.144 This approach makes enforcement
easier because nations are more likely to cooperate when using a forum
that they created.145 Transboundary agreements, by providing specific
terms, encourage nations to determine and commit to the issues that
they are willing to enforce.
Bilateral and multilateral agreements, merely by having fewer
parties involved, can more easily address the specific concerns that will
allow them to protect the right to water and thus benefit their
citizens.146 By adding details specific to each country’s needs, the
nations and neutral bodies they establish can more clearly recognize
which country violated the terms of the treaty and what solution is
allowed under the terms.147 The Indus Waters Treaty and the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 both highlight this fact, since both provide detail
on what is required, how much water each country can use, what they
cannot do, what the treaty covers, and how decisions are made.148 Both
treaties specify how much water a nation can use on a particular river
during a certain season.149 All of this careful specificity helps to prevent
possible issues from developing into major disputes, since the treaty
140. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VIII.
141. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IX.
142. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. IX.
143. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VII–VIII.
144. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VII.
145. See generally WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 22; see also Boundary Waters
Treaty, supra note 56; see also Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 93.
146. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 28.
147. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 16.
148. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55; Indus Waters Treaty, supra note
92.
149. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55; Indus Waters Treaty, supra note
92.
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dictates exactly what should occur.150 International agreements cannot
accomplish this because their goal is often focused on gaining as many
nations to commit to a concept as possible, rather than servicing the
specific needs of each nation.151 Thus, international treaties remain
vague, like the resolution passed by the U.N. General Assembly
recognizing the right to water.152 For an agreement to be effective,
sufficient detail is key so that parties can see who is at fault when
disputes arise and reach a solution to the problem.
As previously discussed, bilateral and multilateral agreements have
great flexibility because they involve only a few nations at most.153 This
flexibility makes them adaptable for multiple purposes because they
can be tailored to the exact desires of the countries involved.154 For
instance, while both have had success, the Indus Commission and the
International Joint Commission have major differences in their makeup,
decision-making processes, and scope of authority.155 This allows
countries greater freedom and permits them to tackle problems head
on, which cannot be done as easily under broader, vaguer international
treaties.156
Transboundary water agreements provide solutions to countries’
actual problems, enforcement mechanisms, and a forum for ensuring
peaceful solutions to any disputes that may arise. They can help protect
the right to water between nations with a shared source of water, while
also promoting peaceful cooperation. Although each transboundary
agreement applies only to a few nations, the formation of more
agreements among more nations will have a greater, positive effect on
the world. Taking inspiration from the World Bank’s involvement in
the Indus Water Treaty, other organizations can help form and enforce
transboundary agreements.157 With outside help, more nations can
150. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55; Indus Waters Treaty, supra note
92.
151. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 792–94.
152. Beail-Farkas, supra note 28, at 784–85.
153. See U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing the benefits of cooperation
between nations with a shared water source.)
154. U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 3.
155. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55; Indus Waters Treaty, supra note
92.
156. See U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 5 (“[M]ultilateral environmental
agreements . . . may not solely address water issues, but help provide an
important support framework for cooperation.”).
157. The World Bank took an active role in forming the agreement and remains
involved in settling any disputes that may arise. Fact Sheet: the Indus Waters
Treaty 1960 and the World Bank, WORLD BANK (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-
treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank [https://perma.cc/7L3S-DDSH]
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make more effective agreements.158 International organizations can take
an active role in forming transboundary agreements and in resolving
disputes that other bodies cannot.159
IV. The Key Components in an Agreement
Transboundary water agreements must contain certain key
components to be effective, otherwise they risk failing for the same
reasons that international treaties often fail. The agreements must
specify the requirements of the nations involved; incorporate an
organization or commission to act as the decision maker with respect
to all aspects of the agreement; and create a mechanism to resolve
disputes when the commission or organization fails to provide a
solution.160 With these components, a bilateral or multilateral
agreement should succeed because it will confer the necessary authority
and provide enough detail so that the agreement can be enforced in a
meaningful way.161
Possibly the most important aspect to any bilateral agreement is
its level of specificity.162 By providing details, nations can know exactly
what rights and obligations they have.163 Further, the agreement should
address what topics or issues the treaty governs and what a nation can
do without seeking prior approval by an oversight body.164 Both the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the Indus Waters Treaty explain
the scope of the agreement, what each nation must do, and what water
sources they have a right to use.165 The Indus Waters treaty goes even
further by detailing financial expectations and shared-data
requirements in order to monitor the conditions of the river basin
effectively.166 Both bilateral agreements also specify how issues will be
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 7; WOUTERS, supra note 138, at 17.
161. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 6 (“Where transboundary watercourse States
agree on how these matters will be dealt with in their international water-
related relations, the potential for effective cooperation is increased; this is
further enhanced where the institutional mechanism that is established. . .is
fully functional.”).
162. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 17–20.
163. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 17–19.
164. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 17–19.
165. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55; Indus Waters Treaty, supra note
92.
166. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 92, at art. VI.
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settled and what constitutes a violation under the treaty.167 By
including specifics, the agreements permit less room for interpretation
and more certainty about what the member countries can and cannot
do. A detailed agreement allows any neutral organization to settle a
dispute for the two nations more easily.168
To keep politics out of the handling of a shared water resource, it
is critical to give an organization the authority to settle any issues or
disputes.169 Further, by giving the organization at least some
independence from the nations involved, the commission can focus on
the facts of the issue and the requirements of the treaty.170 Giving this
body enough authority to handle most issues promotes cooperation and
peace between nations.171 The Indus Commission and the International
Joint Commission both have successfully fulfilled this role for their
treaties.172 The Boundary Treaty of 1909 grants the International Joint
Commission the authority to handle any disputes over the waterways
under regulation of the treaty.173 The International Joint Commission,
through the authority granted to it by the U.S. and Canada, has
successfully settled over 130 disputes between the two countries.174 The
Indus Commission also received authority to handle disputes, but the
member nations also have a clause that allows them to act on issues
independent of the commission.175 While having this provision can help,
the success of the commission is directly linked to the amount of
authority bestowed upon it.176 However, the Indus Commission has
certainly had success in keeping water flowing to both nations, despite
two wars and other conflicts occurring over time.177 A commission or
167. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at art. VIII; Indus Waters Treaty,
supra note 92, at art. IX.
168. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 17–20.
169. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 21–22.
170. WOUTERS, supra note 137, at 21–22.
171. U.N. WATER, supra note 1, at 6–7.
172. Lowe & Silvester, supra note 5; see also Aaron T. Wolf & Joshua T. Newton,
Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: The International Joint
Commission, OREGON STATE UNIV.,
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Documen
ts/ijc.html [http://perma.cc/7L3S-DDSH] (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
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other organization with the authority to decide issues can help settle a
problem before it develops into a larger issue.178
Lastly, any transboundary water agreement must have a
mechanism for resolving issues that the commission or organization
cannot.179 Ideally, the commission will prevent any issue from expanding
into a larger dispute, but back-ups are necessary.180 The Indus Waters
Treaty particularly excels in this area181 It sends all issues first to the
Indus Waters Commission, and then has two steps if the commission
fails to find a compromise for a disagreement.182 Under the first option,
as previously discussed, the issue must be sent to a neutral expert; if
the expert fails to resolve the dispute, the issue goes to a court of
arbitration.183 The court then gives the final decision on the issue.184 By
having these mechanisms, the treaty takes the decision out of the
nations’ hands and places it with a neutral body so that compromise
can be established.185 With these components, an agreement can serve
to promote peaceful resolution to a dispute.
V. Conclusion
People cannot survive without water, and as the world becomes
more arid, conflict over water is more likely to arise. Although
international treaties can incorporate more nations, bilateral
agreements are better at protecting people’s right to water because they
address and prevent geographic-specific conflicts between nations. By
establishing agreements now, nations can develop better relationships
with each other and understand what water belongs to them versus
their neighbors. However, in order for these agreements to succeed, they
must establish rules for all issues, an organization with the proper
authority and means to settle disputes, and a secondary dispute-
resolution procedure if the organization fails to reach a resolution. This
strategy does not ignore international organizations, but rather puts
them in a supporting role. International organizations can help form
the agreements between countries and serve a role in the arbitration
process. By forming strong transboundary agreements, nations can
avoid water-related conflicts and protect their citizens’ right to safe
access to water.
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